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Abstract – Focusing on the concept of Rawlsian-welfare-
analysis, we evaluate land reform in a context of human capital. 
This theoretical and conceptual analysis is applied to the 
question of equity and social inclusion: our model previews that 
latifundia will be divided creating either mesofundia or 
microfundia. The way the social optimum is achieved, and the 
way we express the social welfare function is new to the 
literature, as far as we know, no Rawlsian including land reform 
has been tempted. The Rawlsian welfare function, in a context 
of uncertainty, corresponds to the max-min criteria. This means 
that if land is given to the social underdog, then his welfare 
improves, but the amount of land must be large enough in order 
to get him out of the poverty trap (human capital defined) 
threshold. The iteration of this principle to the successive 
“underdogs” creates the notion of a dynamic social including 
Rawlsian land reform. 
Equity can be improved if we look by the planner’s eyes in a 
Rawlsian way. 
This analysis then can be expanded to free market analysis, 
using the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare Analysis 
and market prices can be retrieved by the Negishi procedure. 
We also present a criticism to Rawlsian land reform, in the form 
of the least state interventionism, an utmost version of the 
liberal paradigm, the anarchic one - Nozickian land reform. 
Keywords - Land reform, Human capital, Rawlsian welfare, 
Difference principle, Ignorance veil, Nozickian land reform. 
1. Introduction 
The process of land reform has been analysed from 
wide perspective, namely from a historical analysis setting. 
In a previous study, I analysed the theoretical relation 
between the influences of land reform in economic growth, 
using a human capital threshold setting. Starting from a 
static background I showed that land reform is only a viable 
welfare enhancing policy if a pro-competition effect 
dominates over a pro-learning effect. The pro-competitive 
effect results from passing from a large latifundia holder to 
multiple competitive minifundia and the pro-learning effect 
results from the marginal cost reduction due to the large 
land owner higher human capital intensity relatively to the 
less skilled or illiterate minifundia holders - for more 
details see Rocha de Sousa (2005). This previous paper also 
had a dynamic background using Arrow (1962) learning by 
doing model and another model by Jovanovic (1982) which 
made use of the theory of the firm to establish the dynamic 
conditions for successful land reforms. For empirical 
evaluation of land reforms programs, namely the applied 
case of NorthEast (NE) Brazil, do see Rocha de Sousa et 
al. (2004). To establish a comparative analysis between 
Portuguese and Brazilian land reform, starting from a 
general empirical typology of land reform do see Branco 
and Rocha de Sousa (2006). 
The focus of land reform with human capital is quite 
new to the literature. Gerbasch and Siemers (2005) is also 
a contribution to the land reform analysis with human 
capital using (OLG) Overlapping Generations models. My 
paper focuses on the welfare analysis, namely on the 
redistributive land reform using a human capital context, 
using a Rawlsian social welfare function.  
Nevertheless, I believe that this social approach using 
the Rawlsian function, within the land reform human 
capital setting, is new to the literature. 
2. Rawlsian welfare analysis 
The Rawlsian welfare criteria states that there is only 
a Pareto movement if the welfare of the worst individual 
(‘underdog’) improves and the others agents stays the 
same. As usual in the economic literature, this is the max 
min (Ui) criteria. 
As far as we know this setting has never been applied 
to land reform with human capital. 
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When we have redistributive land reform, we are 
assuming that a ‘Planner´ redistributes latifundia holdings 
to mesofundia and microfundia. 
We are assuming that there is a human capital 
threshold to escape from a poverty trap. 
But here starts our Rawlsian human capital land 
reform Paradox. 
The landless underdog has no land, when he receives 
land, naturally his welfare improves, because we are 
assuming that land is a normal good. But now we have a 
paradox, if his income increases, but nevertheless his 
income gain is not enough to take him off the poverty 
equilibria, his ‘true’ global welfare doesn’t increase.  
So, what we find is a human capital land reform which 
isn’t really social including because, even the underdog 
improves slightly, this doesn’t take him off the poverty 
line. Thus, the net total income effect even though positive 
is not enough. 
How can we solve this paradox? 
Is it an apparent paradox? 
The solution comes from the state redistributing 
enough land to mesofundia and microfundia in a sense, that 
allows them both minifundia holders to get out of the 
poverty line (‘threshold’ human capital line). Therefore, 
this establishes a ‘new’ criteria for human capital land 
reform: 
In order to have a social including process of land reform 
with human capital: 
The social planner’s redistributive role must pass by a 
redistributive land reform in order to promote a Pareto 
improvement, so the land attributed to the minifundia 
takes them off the poverty line (this is they must exceed 
the income ´threshold’ related human capital) 
 
One should note that by the Second Theorem of 
Welfare Analysis, if we have a Pareto Optimum, we can 
recover the market equilibrium. So, we can by this theorem 
retrieve a Market friendly approach to the Social Rawlsian 
approach. The Negishi approach recovers the prices to be 
applied in the market approach to achieve a social 
optimum. 
Rawls (1971)[1993] in his opus magnum, A theory of 
Justice, first considers in his first part of the book the theory 
of justice, introducing the concept of ignorance veil and the 
difference principle as a principle with equity 
considerations to install a social inclusive society. In his 
second part of the book he considers the role of institutions 
in the formation of the precluded justice principle.  
 In the third part of the book he analyses the ends of 
his theory. 
The main objective of his book is to discuss and lay 
the foundations of a more just and equitable society. As one 
proceeds along this book, it’s only near the final that we 
find the first reference to a peasant society. This is very 
interesting indeed, because this might mean that (ibidem) 
also considered that his theory might be applied to 
agricultural societies. Nevertheless, as far as I know, no 
further theory of Rawlsian Land reform has been 
developed. So, this is the main contribution of this paper. 
Besides this fact, this brief quote from (ibidem) himself, 
might justify that this is not a mere “elucubration of a 
theoretical desire”, but is itself hopefully a valid extension 
and application of Rawlsian theory to the question of the 
land. 
3. The difference principle and the 
ignorance veil: a brief discussion 
The difference principle corresponds to the max-min 
criteria only in a context of uncertainty. That’s why most 
economists tend to reduce the principle of difference to this 
rule.  
Rawls (1971)[1993, p. 71] gives the following 
example, in an uncertain situation: 
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Table 1. Interpretations according to different principles 
 
«Benefits to all» 
 Source: adapted from Rawls (1971)[1993, p.71] 
 
Figure 1. The Rawlsian welfare function 
  
Figure 1, presents the social Rawlsian welfare 
function. The expansion path in the utility space (for two 
agents) is a line which starts at the origin and passes 
through Ui and Uj, which defines respectively (for each 
‘underdog’) the minimum amount of utility to escape from 
a poverty trap. 
Next on Figure 2 we join the preference map with the 
possibility utility frontier in order to attain a social 
optimum for the two ‘underdogs’. As was previewed 
before, the optimum lies in the “corner” of the L preference 
representation, at the highest level of the utility possibility 
frontier (UPF). 
Table 2 illustrates the gains and losses for a situation 
which isn’t a strategy game. We have three circumstances 
(C) and three decisions (D). 
The Max-min rule makes us choose the 3rd decision, 
because the maximum of the worst result in the case of  
 decision 3 (D3) is 5, and in decision D1 is a loss of 7 
and in D2 is a loss of 8. 
Figure 2. The Rawlsian welfare optimum 
Table 2. Choices and welfare under uncertainty 
circumstances 
   
Source: adapted from Rawls (1971)[1993, p.133] 
Nevertheless, the difference principle is more general 
as it includes the max-min criteria (as we know short for 
maximorum-minimorum), and in the context of certainty to 
improve the welfare of the least well-off might not be the 
more social desirable rule - see Rawls (1971)[1993]. 
One of the other important questions (ibidem) 
addresses is the ignorance veil hypothesis. 
Stated briefly, the hypothesis just says that one 
individual before being born does not “know” in which 
family he will belong. The aim of this operational 
hypothesis is to justify an equitable point of departure to all 
the society. If not, there will be a bias, poor will be born 
poor and rich will be born in rich families. So, what he tries 
to accomplish, with this hypothesis is a kind of ex-ante 
“neutrality” principle, in a sense that ex-post there might 
be upward social mobility precluded by state intervention, 
using the Rawlsian welfare criteria. 
 
 
«Functions to 
which all have 
equal access» 
I. EFFICIENCY 
PRINCIPLE 
II. DIFFERENCE 
PRINCIPLE 
Equality as 
existence of 
careers 
opportunities, 
open towards 
each one 
competences 
 
Natural freedom 
system 
 
Natural 
aristocracy 
Equality as 
equitative 
opportunities 
Equality in a 
liberal sense 
Democratic 
equality 
Decisions C1 C2 C3 
D1 -7 8 12 
D2 -8 7 14 
D3 5 6 8 
Ui
Uj
Ui
Uj
W
Ui
Uj
Ui
Uj
W
UPF
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4. Putting in what is out? The excluded 
landless. 
One must address an active social including human 
capital policy. Solidarity promoted by the state, as far as it 
increases the level of human capital, it increases the 
threshold of utility (income generated by a certain given 
amount of land) for the underdog to escape the poverty 
trap. 
Figure 3. Active social including human capital policy 
 
 
Figure 3 depicts graphically a Pareto movement due 
to the promoted social including policy. 
As one proceeds along the expansion path generated 
by the pro-active inclusive land reform human capital 
policy, one sees that each underdog sequentially increases 
his poverty-stricken threshold to get out of the immersing 
income trap. As this process continues the lowest (from W0 
to W1 in the figure 3) and the mean level of welfare will 
increase, because even if we have a skewed distribution of 
income (related to the human capital threshold), if the 
lowest levels of income are sequentially increasing then 
ceteris paribus, and sooner or later, the mean income 
(generated by the level of human capital) will definitely 
increase. Thus, as this is a sequential process each agent 
might escape poverty more likely. 
5. Nozickian land reform and criticisms 
to Rawlsian land reform 
Nozick (1974)[1997], one of the forerunners political 
philosophers of the XX century, also from the Harvard 
tradition, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, raised a severe 
criticism to his colleague Rawls’ Theory of Justice. His 
main view was that, following the anarchic tradition, the 
State should be minimal, and thus its intervention should, 
if ever happened, it should be only when there was no other 
way out to solve the problem. 
Making the comparison to our Rawlsian Land reform, 
we did an aggregate welfare analysis using the planner’s 
view, but we tried to resolve this criticism (of using the 
planner) by using the Negishi procedure. This procedure 
just states by the Second Fundamental Theorem of Welfare 
Economics, that a planner’s aggregate allocation can be 
retrieved by the market, if preferences are well behaved and 
functions are continuous. 
Here starts our problem: Does Rawlsian welfare 
function comply with the Negishi setup? 
The Rawlsian aggregate welfare function is of the 
Leontief type (the conventional ‘L’ representation familiar 
to most economists). Even though we can’t have a tangency 
condition between the social indifference curve and the 
social utility possibility frontier (thus enabling some sort of 
price ratios), if the utility possibility frontier is smooth (as 
we presented it in figures 2 and 3), then due to the 
smoothness of the utility possibility frontier, the price ratio 
will be unique and thus will define a unique equilibrium 
point for the two Rawlsian underdogs. Thus, the market 
will retrieve a unique price which will yield the same result 
as a Rawlsian planner welfarist land reformer. 
But what if the Utility Possibility Frontier (UPF) is not 
smooth? 
Then there won’t be a unique expansion path for the 
Rawlsian land reform planner, or at least if the expansion 
path exists, it might be “not well behaved”. Thus, instead 
of the linear expansion path I presented, we could have 
multiplicity of equilibria, or, even if is unique, “badly” 
behaved expansion paths. 
Thus, we precluded a Rawlsian Land Reform (even 
though using a planner´s welfarist approach) equivalent to 
a market approach and raised a criticism, which enables us 
to talk about a Nozickian Land Reform – Land should be 
redistributed by the State, if only there is no other way out. 
So, Nozickian Land reform comes, as an utmost liberal 
tradition, thus in the anarchist tradition, as a market 
solution to land reform. Hayek (1960)[1993] also stressed 
the role of markets in achieving better results than 
planner’s. 
One must stress that what we are talking about, when 
we proceed to do a land reform, is an institutional change. 
As North (1990)[2004] has pointed out, institutions are key 
factors to economic change, because their well-functioning 
is a key factor for economic evolution. Thus, land reform, 
independently of being Rawlsian (in the sense of improving 
‘underdogs’) or Nozickian (in the sense of having the least 
state intervention), is itself a process of institutional 
economic change. Its future should be determined by the 
people, as responsible as they are in the accountable 
democracies. Their design should be done within society’s 
interaction and with the people’s participation, because as 
we know by historical experience, as the people get more 
incentives, the aggregate outcomes will be better. 
Nevertheless, we stress that the criteria for justice as 
Ui
Uj
Ui
Uj
W0
UPF
E0
E1 W1
Expansion Path
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fairness is extremely important. In too simple words, it is 
not only the size of the cake to split that matters, but also 
the rules and its final division. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
This paper presented a land reform in a Rawlsian 
context, within the framework of human capital models. 
This is the main contribution of the paper. The difference 
principle, the max-min principle as is familiar to 
economists in an uncertainty context, is applied to define a 
social including Rawlsian land reform: the social 
“underdog” must be given a plot of land sufficiently large 
enough to allow him to escape the poverty (human capital 
defined) threshold. The iteration of this principle to the 
successive “underdogs” creates the notion of a dynamic 
social including Rawlsian land reform. 
We also presented a criticism, which we called it 
Nozickian land reform, thus the least interventionism state 
rule, an utmost anarchic rule, which shall deserve further 
study. To comply these two contradictory views, we 
stressed the view of NORTH of land reform as a continuous 
evolving institutional set-up. 
As a direction for future improvements we would like 
to proceed in the expected way, i.e. by questioning the way 
equity and efficiency within land reform are compatible (as 
it was considered in this paper). 
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